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of autobiographical memory? 
By Damian E M Milton 
Autobiographical memories form the basiƐ ŽĨ ĂŶ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛ ƐĞŶƐĞ ŽĨ ƐĞůĨ-history, as Conway and 
,ŽůŵĞƐ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ ? ƚŚĞǇ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ Ă  ‘ĚĂƚĂďĂƐĞ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞůĨ ?  dŚĞƐĞ ŵĞŵŽƌŝĞƐ ŚĞůƉ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ƚŽ
interact with one another, give a sense of personal and social history, and provide a sense of 
continuity to experience which would otherwise not be possible.  This essay endeavours to explore 
ƚŚĞƵƚŝůŝƚǇŽĨ ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨĂ  ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐĞůĨ ? ŝŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ ĨŽƌŚŽǁĂƵƚŽďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůŵĞŵŽƌŝĞƐĂƌĞ
cognitively organised. 
For Conway and Holmes (2005), due to the complexity of autobiographical memories, some sort of 
central or executive processing must be implicated in their construction, in order to maintain them 
ĂŶĚŬĞĞƉ ŝƌƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽƵƚŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐŵŝŶĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƌĞĐĂůů ŝƐĐĞŶƚƌĞĚƵƉŽŶƚŚĞƚĂƐŬŽƌŐŽĂů
currently being undertaken by an individual.  Such processes are complex and yet central to much 
human life and utilise a number of different parts of the brain.  Due to this, autobiographical 
memory is vulnerable to disruption through trauma or illness. 
Conway and Pleydell-WĞĂƌĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĐŝƚĞĚŝŶŽŶǁĂǇĂŶĚ,ŽůŵĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƵƐĞƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨĂ ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ
ƐĞůĨ ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐ ŚŽǁ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ƉůĂĐĞ ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ŐŽĂůƐ ĂŶĚ ƐĞůĨ-conceptions in an hierarchical 
ŵĞŶƚĂů ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ?  dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ƐĞůĨ ? ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐǀŝĞǁ ? ŚĂƐ Ăvery large influence on how 
autobiographical experiences are stored and retrieved, and how memories are personally 
constructed.  They also postulate that periods of change and personal development will have an 
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ƵƉŽŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ƐĞůĨ ? ĂŶĚ ƌetain particular salience in an ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛ ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů
constructions. 
&ŽƌŽŶǁĂǇĂŶĚ,ŽůŵĞƐ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞ  ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐĞůĨ ? ĨŝƌƐƚĚĞǀĞůŽƉƐ ŝŶ ŝŶĨĂŶĐǇ ?ǁŚĞŶĂĐŚŝůĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉƐ
the ability for objective and subjective self-ĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐ  ? ‘/ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŵĞ ?), yet these early memories 
become less accessible as the child develops and only stabilises in late adolescence (Erikson and 
Erikson, 1982, cited in Conway and Holmes, 2005).  Conway and Holmes (2005) cite a number of 
studies that ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚ ‘ĐŚŝůĚŚŽŽĚĂŵŶĞƐŝĂ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂĚƵůƚs struggle to retrieve memories before the 
age of five, which were once freely available in their brains when they were children.  Conway and 
Pleydell-Pearce (2000, cited in Conway and Holmes, 2005) suggested that this change occurred due 
to changes in the ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ƐĞůĨ ?Ɛ ŐŽĂů ŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚǇ ? ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ƌĞƚƌŝĞǀĂů ŽĨ ƐƵĐŚĞĂƌůŝĞƌ ŵĞŵŽƌŝĞƐ ŵŽƌĞ
ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚĂƐƚŚĞǇůŽƐĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƐĂůŝĞŶĐĞ ?ŵŽƌĞ&ƌĞƵĚŝĂŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ
ƐĞůĨ ? ŝƐƵŶĂďůĞƚŽĐŽŶƚƌŽůƚŚĞĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂů ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇŽĨĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚƵƐĞƉŝƐodic memories from early 
ĐŚŝůĚŚŽŽĚĐŽƵůĚ ŝŵƉĂĐƚƵƉŽŶƚŚĞĂĚƵůƚ  ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐĞůĨ ?ďǇƌĞŝŶǀŝŐŽƌĂƚŝŶŐ ŝŶƚĞŶƐĞĞŵŽƚŝŽŶƐ ĨƌŽŵƚŚŝƐ
period.  This theory would suggest that the adult working self places constraints on memories from 
childhood, resurfacing. 
 Conway and Holmes (2005) suggest that when adults over the age of 35 are asked to freely recall 
significant autobiographical memories, there was a clustering around the late adolescent/early 
ĂĚƵůƚŚŽŽĚĂŐĞƌĂŶŐĞ ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚŝŶĂŐƌĂƉŚďǇĂ ‘ƌĞŵŝŶŝƐĐĞŶĐĞďƵŵƉ ?(RB) iŶƚŚĞ ‘ůŝĨĞƐƉĂŶƌĞƚƌŝĞǀĂů
ĐƵƌǀĞ ?(LRC) at this stage in the life course.  This recall effect has been found to aid the remembering 
of public events and cultural expression of the era concerned.  These memories are also thought to 
be more accurate and judged to be more important to the individual (Rubin et al. 1998, cited in 
Conway and Holmes, 2005).  It has been found that the RB is not due to memories being of first time 
experiences, or a more efficient memory system at this age (Conway and Holmes, 2005).  Fitzgerald 
(1988, cited in Conway and Holmes, 2005) suggested that this period in life was characterised by 
self-defining experiences ƚŚĂƚůŝŶŬƚŚĞ ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐĞůĨ ? to a lived reality, salient in terms of a period of 
time when identity is becoming more defined. 
^ƚƵĚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ>ZŚĂǀĞĂůƐŽĨŽƵŶĚĂ ‘ƌĞĐĞŶĐǇĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐŵĞŵŽƌŝĞƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞ, the further in the 
past that something is experienced, the harder it is to recall (apart from the RB).  Memories that 
have been encoded more recently are thus easier to retrieve.  When people are specifically asked to 
ƌĞĐĂůů ĞĂƌůǇ ŵĞŵŽƌŝĞƐ ? ƉĞŽƉůĞ ŽĨƚĞŶ ĂƌĞ ĂďůĞ ƚŽ ? ƐŽ ƚŚŝƐĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŝŶ  ‘ĨƌĞĞ ƌĞĐĂůů ? ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ ƚŚĂƚ
rather than forgetting information, people preference the recall of recently stored information 
(Conway and Holmes, 2005). 
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000, cited in Conway and Holmes, 2005) suggested that 
autobiographical knowledge can be viewed in terms of the specificity of events, ranging from 
 ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ? ƚŽ  ‘ůŝĨĞƚŝŵĞ ƉĞƌŝŽĚƐ ? ?  'ĞŶĞƌĂů ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ƌĨĞƌ ƚo an array of knowledge structures 
concerning single events, repeated events, or extended events (e.g. a holiday); and can be processed 
in a number of ways.  Robinson (1992, cited in Conway and Holmes, 2005) found that general events 
can be structured in tĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ  ‘ŵŝŶŝ-ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĞƐ ? containing detailed episodic memories of attaining 
one ?s goals, and Pillemer (1998, cited in Conway and Holmes, 2005) argued that such events can 
become significant reference points of constructing a sense of self-identity.  McAdams et al. (2001, 
cited in Conway and Holmes, 2005) also found that general events may be organised together due to 
their emotional similarity.  Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000, cited in Conway and Holmes, 2005) 
conclude that general events containing knowledge of context, actions, emotions and goals; can be 
represented through imagery, emotions, language used and so on; and are organised in mental 
models. 
 ‘>ŝĨĞƚŝŵĞ ƉĞƌŝŽĚƐ ? ? ůŝŬĞ  ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ? ? ĂůƐŽ ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĨ ĂƵƚŽďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂů ŵĞŵŽƌŝĞƐ ŽĨ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ, 
emotions and goals; yet refer ƚŽĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƉĞƌŝŽĚŽĨƚŝŵĞǁŝƚŚŝŶĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐůŝĨĞĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ĂŶĚĐĂŶ
be a way of accessing autobiographical knowledge, and evaluating knowledge in terms of goal 
attainment (Beike and Landoll, 2000, cited in Conway and Holmes, 2005).  Bluck and Habermas 
(2000, cited in Conway and Holmes, 2005) suggest that these periods are important in building an 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛ ‘ůŝĨĞƐƚŽƌǇ ? ? ‘ůŝĨĞƐƚŽƌǇ ? ŐŝǀĞƐŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƚŽĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐůŝĨĞĂŶĚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚs of schema and 
themes.  Lifetime period knowledge provides support for the generation of schema and information 
utilisable for the evaluation of personal goals.  This type of autobiographical knowledge is less event 
specific and related more to abstractions and concepts of self progression.  Conway (1996, cited in 
Conway and Holmes, 2005) argues that these forms of autobiographical knowledge form 
 ‘ŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚŝĐĂů ƉĂƌƚŽŶŽŵŝĐ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ? ? ƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐ ƚŽ ŚŽǁ ĞƉŝƐŽĚŝĐ ŵĞŵŽƌǇ ĨŽƌŵ a part of 
general events, which are part of lifetime periodƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞŶĨŽƌŵĂ ‘ůŝĨĞƐƚŽƌǇ ? ? 
 dƵůǀŝŶŐ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ĐŝƚĞĚ ŝŶ ŽŶǁĂǇ ĂŶĚ ,ŽůŵĞƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ƉŽƐƚƵůĂƚĞĚ Ă ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ‘ĞƉŝƐŽĚŝĐ
ŵĞŵŽƌǇ ?ĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞĚďǇŝƚƐƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŝƚǇƚŽƚŝŵĞĂŶĚƉůĂĐĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐŵĞŵŽƌǇ ?ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚďǇ
abstract and conceptual knowledge that is context-free.  This distinction begins to break down 
however, as episodic memories can be seen to hold semantic meaning, and semantic memories 
often contain specific events.  This led Tulving (cited in Conway and Holmes, 2005) to later consider 
the defining feature of episodic memory to be Ă  ‘ƌĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂŶ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŚĂƐ 
ĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐŽĨ ‘ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐŝŶŐƚŚĞƉĂƐƚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŽĐĐƵƌǁŝƚŚŽƚŚĞƌƚǇƉĞƐŽĨŵĞŵŽƌǇƌĞƚƌŝĞǀĂů ?  For 
Conway (2001, cited in Conway and Holmes, 2005) however, episodic memories are of a largely 
sensory-perceptual nature, yet will not endure as memories unless attached semantically to more 
permanent mental representations of an autobiography. 
Tulving (1983, cited in Conway and Holmes, 2005) argued that when indŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚ ĂŶ
ĂƵƚŽďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůŵĞŵŽƌǇ ?ƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞƐǇƐƚĞŵĞŶƚĞƌƐ ŝŶƚŽĂ  ‘ƌĞƚƌŝĞǀĂůŵŽĚĞ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ
directed inwards, and consciousness becomes engaged in internal mental representations.  As a 
memory forms, the individual recollecting the past becomes emotionally influenced by the 
experience, and a sense of self in the past is realised.  Recall of autobiographical memories, could 
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞǁŝƚŚĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨ ‘ŝŶƚƌƵƐŝǀĞƌĞĐĂůů ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞƉƌŝŽƌ
traumatic events can involuntarily resurface into consciousness ? Ă ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ƐǇŵƉƚŽŵĂƚŝĐ ŽĨ  ‘ƉŽƐƚ-
ƚƌĂƵŵĂƚŝĐƐƚƌĞƐƐĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌ ? (PTSD).  Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000, cited in Conway and Holmes, 
2005) argue that due to the emotional salience of autobiographical memory and its potential 
disruptive effect on everyday functioning, controlling and managing memory constructions, is one of 
ƚŚĞŵĂŝŶ ‘ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐĞůĨ ?  Conway and Holmes (2005) suggest that there are two ways 
in which to enter retrieval ŵŽĚĞ P ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ ? ?ďĞŝŶŐĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐĂŶĚŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĚŝƌĞĐƚ ?ƌĞƚƌŝĞǀĂů ?
triggered by external cues that become linked to a previous event.   
Conway and Holmes (2005) argue that the working self structures goals into a hierarchy, and that 
goal related experiences are prioritised in the construction of autobiographical memories.  Markus 
(1977, cited in Conway and Holmes, 2005) found that individuals that showed a strong personality 
trait on the independence-dependence continuum, showed preferences to memories of experiences 
where they had acted in an independent or dependent way respectively; yet, this was not the case 
for those who did not show such a strong trait in this regard.  The effects of personality on the 
shaping of autobiographical memories, has also been found with other traits, such as power-seeking, 
intimacy, and generativity; referring to caring for phenomena that will outlast the self (Conway and 
Holmes, 2005). 
Pillemar (1998, cited in Conway and Holmes, 2005) examined the memories people had regarding 
 ‘ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĞƉŝƐŽĚĞƐ ? ? ĂŶĚ ĨŽƵŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĂƵƚŽďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĞƐ ŽĨ ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ  ?ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ
ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚĞĂĐŚĞƌƐ ?ŽĨƚĞŶĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐŽĨ ‘ƚƵƌŶŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚƐ ? ?ďŽƚŚŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞŝŶ
the construction of a working self, that could have a profound effect on sense of self for an 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?s entire life, from being an inspiration, to forming a self-concept of an inadequate learner.  
Singer and Salovey (1993, cited in Conway and Holmes, 2005) found that memories associated with 
emotions of happiness and pride, were strongly linked to the attainment of goals prioritised by the 
working self.  Conversely, memories associated with negative emotions were often associated with 
ĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐŽĨĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽƌĞĂĐŚŽŶĞ ?ƐŐŽĂůƐ ?&Žƌ^ŝŶŐĞƌĂŶĚ^ĂůŽǀĞǇ ? ? ?93, cited in Conway and Holmes, 
 ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞƐĞŵĞŵŽƌŝĞƐďĞĐŽŵĞ ‘ƐĞůĨ-ĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐ ? ? 
 hƐŝŶŐĚĂƚĂĨƌŽŵĨDZ/ ?ZW ?ĂŶĚƐƚƵĚŝĞƐůŽŽŬŝŶŐĂƚ ‘ƐƉůŝƚ-ďƌĂŝŶƐ ?ĂŶĚĨŽĐĂůůĞƐŝŽŶƐ ?<ĞĞŶĂŶĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
examined the relationship between self-recognition and other self processes, such as self-evaluation 
and autobiographical retrieval.  By reviewing this evidence, Keenan et al. (2000) concluded that self-
processes, including everything from self-recognition to autobiographical memory, preferentially 
activate networks in the right fronto-temporal region.  For Keenan et al. (2000) self-recognition 
indicates a state of self-awareness not found in non-human primates.  Without this skill, even the 
most fundamental aspects of reflective thought would not be possible.  They also argue that the 
 ‘ƐĞůĨ-ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ ?ŵĂǇƐŚĂƌĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐŶĞƵƌĂůƐƵďƐƚƌĂƚƵŵĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨŵŝŶĚ ?ĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ? 
DĂŐŶŽ ĂŶĚ ůůĂŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ĂůƐŽ ĞǆĂŵŝŶĞĚ ŶĞƵƌĂů ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ŝŶƚĂƐŬƐ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ƐĞůĨ ? ǁĂƐ
implicated, in order to see whether or not there was a specific memory system underlying a 
conscious sense of self continuing through time.  Using ERP techniques, a common neural signature 
was found to be associated with self-processing for retrieving general knowledge (noetic awareness) 
ĂŶĚĨŽƌ ‘ƌĞ-ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐŝŶŐ ?ƉĂƐƚ events (autonoetic awareness).  Thus, their findings suggest that there 
is a single locus of control in the brain for the ordering of explicit memories.  For Magno and Allan 
(2007), access to self-referential information requires a functionally independent executive control 
ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?Ă ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐĞůĨ ? ? ?ǇĞƚĂůƐŽĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚƐĞůĨ-referential processing was required earlier 
in the process in the construction of autonoetic memories. 
A number of studies (Millward et al., 2000; Bowler et al., 2000; Klein et al., 2004; Goddard et al., 
2006; Goldman, 2008) have found that those diagnosed as on the autism spectrum have an impaired 
ability to recall personally experienced events.  It is theorised by Millward et al. (2000) that people 
on the autistic spectrum have a specific memory deficit pertaining to the self.  Goldman (2008) 
suggested that people on the autism spectrum are frequently able to understand the mechanics of a 
personal narrative, yet often lack the sense of personal information that gives meaning to social 
stories, such as an inability to provide a central  ‘ŚŝŐŚƉŽŝŶƚ ? ƚŽƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů
narratives.  Klein et al. (2004) found that a breakdown in any of the key components that transform 
memorial representations into autobiographical experiences can be implicated in the taxonomy of 
many syndromes and disorders, from autism, to amnesia, frontal lobe pathology and schizophrenia. 
dŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ Ă  ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ƐĞůĨ ? ǁŝƚŚ Ă ŐŽĂůoriented hierarchical structure is a useful way of 
explaining the evidence presented by Conway and Holmes (2005).  It would suggest that the purpose 
or function of the working self is to monitor and control access to pertinent knowledge held within 
long-term memory, with impairments in these systems being implicated in a number of mental 
disorders and syndromes (Klein et al., 2005).  This processing need not be conscious however, 
although the working self may also be able to direct attention and influence processing.  The 
retention of memories in the construction of autobiographical memories, are filtered through the 
goal structure of the working self and integrated into pre-existing knowledge structures.  This is not 
a passive process but highly selective, where memories and experiences of events are interpreted 
ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚƉƌŝŽƌƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƐĞůĨ ?  It can be seen from the evidence 
ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ ŝŶƚŚŝƐĞƐƐĂǇƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐĞůĨ ? ŝƐǁĞůů ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ by research, and a 
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